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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, 
Plaintiff an.d Appellant_, 
vs, 
TERRY R. 'VES'l~ and FLORA E. 
WEST, 
Defendants andRespondents. 
I 
\ 
' 
I 
\Case No. 
10251 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMIN Alt,.Y S'J,A'fE~IEN'f 
There is disagree1nen t not only as to the correct-
ness of the findings belo\v, but also as to what those 
findings are. 
Respondents allege that certain of appellant's 
arguments on appeal are ",vill-o' -the-wisps" and not 
issues. (Respondents' brief, p. 20). Any reflection 
thereby cast upon this vvriter's sense of relevancy is 
3 
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tolerable, because of the satisfaction concurrently de-
rived from the simplifiea tion of the case which the 
charge encourages. 
Argument III of appellant's main brief challenged 
the correctness of "the court's finding that a1nounts 
awarded to defendants "\\rere 'by way of gift' ... " Re-
spondents have replied by contending that "['f]he court 
did not award by way of gift ... "; that "While the 
parties clearly intended and believed that a gift had 
been ·made it is completely academic ... whether a 
gift was Inade or not. . . ''; that the decision below 
fallows solely from a deter1nina tion of the rights and 
obligations arising from contract law, and that any 
"gift talk" is relevant only to show "contract intent". 
(Respondents' brief pp. 20-21.) 
The only reference in the findings of facts below 
to the intention and understanding of the parties in 
regnrd to the eft ect of the partnership and dissolution 
agreements is Finding of ~_,act No. 10, which reads: 
"That the parties and particularly plaintiff, 
Rulon, and defendant, 'ferry, intended and un· 
derstood that the effect of the agreetnents 'vhere-
by 'l~erry and Flora ''rould receive, upon disso-
lution forty ( 40Cfo) per cent and twenty {20Cfo) 
per cent respectiYe ly of the amount paid into 
capital by Rulon as finally adjusted and deter-
mined herein, 'Yas that snch receipt 'leas b,y way 
of gift fro1n Rulon to Terry and Flora." [Em· 
phasis supplied]. 
This finding that the parties intended and understood 
4 
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that the effect of the agreement was that Terry and 
Flora would receive their shares by way of gift is 
inconsistent ,vith the contention that their shares 'vere 
awarded by 'vay of contract. 
rrhe general rule is that a valid contract must be 
supported by consideration. And consideration for a 
promi~e tnust be something ''bargained for . . . '' Re-
statement of Contracts, §7·:5. Rulon, in executing these 
agreements, did ,not bargain for anything Terry either 
did or promised to do, and rferry was under no Inis-
conception that Rulon had bargained for anything 
Terry either did or prornised to do, if both ·Rulon and 
Terry intended and understood that the effect of the 
agreements was that Terry and Flor.,~ would receive. 
their shares by way of gift. 
There are circumstances where informal contracts 
not supported by "bargained for" consideration are 
enforceable. 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 116. But the ex-
ceptions are not applicable to this case. 
If respondents are unwilling to meet the issue of 
whether there was a gift, the result is that the disso-
lution agreement is not a legally operative document. 
At the time this action was commenced, the partner-
ship was being operated by Terry much as before, and 
no sale of any substantial part of the partnership assets 
had been made. There was no winding up of the partner-
ship affairs. 'fhere had been no reliance by Terry on 
the dissolution agreement which might conceivably 
have-nlade applicable an exception to the general rule 
5 
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on "bargained for" consideration. Therefore, it could 
not have been effective as a contract, in view of Finding 
No. 10. Even apart fro1n Finding No. 10, it was not 
valid as a contract for the reasons already detailed in 
Argument II of the main brief. 
'l,he dissolution agree1nent should be deemed rele-
vant only as it sheds light on the intention and under-
standing of the parties at the time the partnership was 
created and at the various subsequent ti1nes when Rulou 
made additional financial contributions. As evidence 
of this earlier intention, however, it would see1n to haYe 
little value. As said in the main brief, the 1960 talk 
between the parties about gifts, sharing capital ac-
counts, and the desire of ltulon to make so1ne provision 
for distribution of his estate, all occurred at about the 
time the parties were attempting to settle their differ-
ences. Ahnost three years had passed since the articles 
of partnership were entered into, and although those 
negotiations might haYe a bearing upon the i11terpre~ 
tation and effect of the agree1nents of March and April, 
1960. their bearing upon "That the parties meant in 
Septen1ber and October~ 1957~ is not discernible -
except insofar as they seem to be negotiating about 
something Rulon owned,. 
Flurthermore, if the respondents are unwilling to 
meet the issue of '""hether there was a giftJ the result 
should be that the partnership agreement itself, insofar 
as it relates to the shares ''T hich the partners are to 
receive on dissolution, is also legally inoperative because 
0 
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of Finding No. 10. It is true that pursuant to that 
agreement 'ferry began to 1nanage the business, but 
there is no showing that the salary he was to receiYe 
,vas not adequate compensation for the services ren-
dered. Indeed, when he undertook management of the 
business it would be difficult to believe that he was 
relying heavily on future contributions to be made by 
Rulon, because there "'as no assurance that such con-
tributions would be made. In regard to Flora, there 
is no evidence of any significant reliance whatever. 
Consequently this is not a case for the application of 
any principal of promissory estoppel on behalf of either 
Terry or Flora, which might otherwise be an exception 
to the rule on consideration. 
Before replying to the arguments on cross appeal, 
this writer would like to make brief reference to re-
spondents' use of the record in their brief. 
On page 9 of respondent's brief, the following 
question and answer from Flora's deposition (R. 179) 
are quoted: 
"Q.: Was it your thought, then, that if you 
received some share of the corporation (partner-
ship) that it dated from that gift you are talking 
about? 
·. "A.: From the beyinniny ... from the begining 
... from the beginnin,q of the partnership. (R. 
179 (Emphasis added) . " 
The court may find it helpful to read the next question 
and ans,vcr in the same deposition (R. 179). 
7 
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"Q.: And, as I understand, you figured even 
at the moment you received this so-called gift 
that you already o'vned 40 per cent of the part-
nership? 
"A.: I never give [sic] it a thought because I 
didn't go into detail there. I never thought of 
it being sold, to ever go into it' that far. I was 
more worried about the losses in [sic] the profits 
than anything, because that concerned me ·more 
than anything.'' 
In the answer quoted by respondents, Flora adamantly 
claims her· interest in the partnership dated from the 
beginning of the partnership. In her very next answer, 
which respondents omitted ,from their brief, Flora said 
she never thought about "Then she got any interest in 
the partnership capital. She was n1ore interested in 
profit and loss. 
Similar observations might be made about the other 
quotation fro1n Flora's deposition on that same page 
( p. 9) of respondents' brief. 
On ·page 16 ·of respondents' brief, Flora's depo· 
sition is again quoted. 
"Q.: It was your understanding that you would 
be the owner of 20 per cent of that (Terry's 
investment) 
A.: Of what he put in? 
Q.: Yes. 
A.: That all depended. * * * if the thing was 
sold} !JO'zt .knot:c what hap pens. If it isn't sol~, 
I co1ne in for profits. (R. 182) (Emphas~s 
added)". 
8 
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The last answer of Flora, without omissions, reads in 
its entirety (R. 182) : 
"A.: 'fbat all depended. I don't know, if the 
thing was sold, you know, what happens. If 
it isn't sold, I co1ne -in for profit. I don't know 
that 'ferry's went into profits; I think it went 
into assets. I don't know; I have never asked 
h. , un. 
It is not inconceivable that Flora meant what respond-
ents, by leaving out wo~ds and punctuation, quote her 
as saying. However, in view of Flora's earlier state-
Inents, as noted above, to the effect that she was more 
concerned about profit and loss than an interest in 
capital, the court may wish to conclude that Flora meant 
what she said, without leaving out any words or punctu-
ation. 
It is probably inevitable that in any case where 
it must be determined whether the evidence supports 
the findings below, the demands on the court's time are 
unusually great because a careful review of the record 
is required in order to reconstruct an accurate picture 
of what happened and what was said, in its proper 
context. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
FINDING ,NO. 6 -\VAS NOT ERRONEOUS 
FOR 'fHE REASONS ASSERTED BY THE 
RESPONDENTS. 
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Appellant urges that all sums paid into the part-
nership should be returned to him, subject to minor 
adjustments, and not just those sums put into the 
business af~er Dece:mber a; 1958~ In any event, the 
sums ·paid into the partnership after that date should 
he returned to appellant and Finding No. 6 was not 
erroneous for the reasons asserted by respondents. 
Respondents contend in Argument VII that Ex-
hibits 9 and 10, which are letters written by Rulon to 
Terry, were improperly admitted in evidence. Exhibit 
9 was a letter in which Rulon as~d Terry to make 
up a series of notes representing the money Rulon 
had put into the business .Exhibit 10 was another letter 
to Terry referring to the same matter. Respondents 
argue that these letters were self-serving and the ad-
mission thereof was a violation of the hearsay rule. 
If a statement is relevant without regard to the 
rna tters asserted therein, there can be no valid hearsay 
objection to its admission for the purpose simply of 
sho_wing that the state1nent was made. Mower v. Mower, 
64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911, 915. 
In Cowen v. T. J. Stewart Lumber Co.~ 177 Okl. 
266, 58 P .2d 573, an· impoi·tant ·issue was whether the 
relationship between two companies was that of prin· 
cipal and agent 01~ ·seller and buyer. Invoices sent by 
one C0111pany to the . other 'vere offered in evidence to 
show that the latter relationship existed. In upholding 
the trial cou_rt's admission of the evidence, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court said: 
10 
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"Great emphasis is 1nade by the defendant that 
such evidence was self-serving. All evidence is 
self-serving at the time it is offered, else it would 
not be offered. ''rhether declarations or com-
munications are self-serving is determined as 
of the time they are made. And though a decla-
ration may be self-serving on one issue, it may 
have independent releYance 011 another issue, 
and for that reason be admissible. The rule of 
exclusion of self -serving declarations is a branch 
of the hearsay rule and its application is gov-
erned largely by the same tests. The inYoices in 
the present case \vere not offered as evidence 
that the material was furnished, for that fact was 
admitted. They "~ere offered for the purpose of 
establishing the relationship of the parties, cir-
cumstantially, and not as direct evidence of the 
truth of the subject-Inatter of the invoices them-
selves." 58 P.2d at 576-77. 
Another case in which writings were held to have 
been properly admitted because not offered to prove 
the truth of the matters therein asserted is McCord v. 
Ashbaugh_, 67 N. 1\'I. 61, 352 P.2d 641. An important 
issue in that case was whether a grantee (not a party 
in the case) had received any beneficial interest in the 
property. 'fhe grantor offered in evidence correspond-
ence between his attorney and Forest Service officials 
to show the motivating factor in conveying the prop-
erty. The court held the evidence admissible because it 
was not offered to prove the truth of anything con-
tained in the correspondence. 
Regardless of whether or not Rulon had put into 
the business th(~ n1oney he refers to in the letters, and 
11 
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regardless of whether· or not interest was to accrue 
at the rate of 57o per annun1 in accordance with their 
"mutual understanding," the ]etters are relevant be-
cause the mere fact that Rulon said what he did therein 
is only consistent with a finding that at least from that 
time forward money advanced by him was to be re-
turned. 
Another basis for upholding the trial court's ad-
mission of Exhibits 9 and 10 is that they are relevant 
to show Rulon's intent, and declarations showing intent 
are exceptions to the hearsay rule. As said in First 
~ecurity Bank of Utah v. Burgi~ 122 Utah, 445, 251 
P.2d 297: 
"Delivery is essentially a matter of intent. 
Such intent is to be arrived at from all the facts 
and surrounding circumstances, both before and 
,_after the date of the deed, including declarations 
of the alleged grantor vlhere it appears the decla-
rations are made fairly and in the ordinary 
course of life. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 
~4 P .2d 465; Thlower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 
228 Pac. :911, 914." 251 P.2d at 299. 
'l.,he grantor in the Burgi case was deceased, but the 
court's state1ne:ht is not li1nited to declarations of a 
deceased and in principle there is no- reason ,vhy it 
should be. 
None of the cases cited in respondents' brief iri 
support of their arg'ument that Exhibits 9 and 10 were 
imp1·operly admitted involved situations where the evi· 
dence ,vas relevant ",.ithout regard to the truth of the 
12 
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1natters therein asserted or where the evidence was of 
intention ,vhere intention was a relevant issue. 
Exhibits 9 and 10 were not only properly ad1nitted 
in evidence, but counsel for the respondents did not 
adequately point out at the trial what he claimed was 
wrong ,vith the exhibits in order to preserve an objec-
tion for review on appeal. See In Re Richard~s Estate~ 
5 U. 2d 106, 297 P.2d 5~t2. Counsel for respondents 
did not object to Exhibit 9 as being self-serving or 
hearsay. (R. 156). The objection was made to Exhibit 
10 that it was "completely self-se1·ving" (R. 157), 
but no reference was 1nade to the hearsay rule. Appe~­
lant contends that this objection was not specific enough. 
There would hardly be any record in this case if every-
thing which is self -serving were omitted. As revealed in 
respondents' brief (p. 31), the real objection raised on 
appeal is that the evidence was hearsay, which objec-
tion was not raised in the trial court. 
Respondents contend in .L\rgument VII that Find-
ing No. 6 is also erroneous because "it seeks to i1npose 
a contract of loan which is always bilateral, upon the 
parties by proof only of a unilateral intent of one 
party." ( p. 31) There is no elaboration of this point. 
The word "loan" is used frequently by all parties in 
this case and is perhaps a useful term to refer to ad-
vances by one party which are to be returned to him. 
The word is not used, however, in 48-1-15 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 'vhich states the usual rights and duties 
of partners, subject to ~ny agreement between them. 
Subsection ( 1 ) thereof provides : 
13 
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· . "Each partner shaH be repaid his contribu-
. _t1ons, w~ether by way of capital or advances to 
· the partnership property . . . " 
It is clea:r; fro~ this._provision, con~rary to respondents' 
assertion,. that the bilateral. intent is r_equired to h~~e 
money advanced by .a partner not repaid to him. Where-
as the word "loan" has been used by the parties," the 
word has been used in a very special sense and the 
general law on ban~ loant? or any other kind of loans 
is not necessarily applicable.· 
II 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 3 'fHAT "GROSS 
PROFITS" ARE TO -BE DETERMINED BE-
FORE DEDUCTING SALARIES TO PART-
NERS WAS- NOT ERRONEOUS. 
Respondents.· contend that salaries to partners 
should be dedu~ted in calculating gross profits. Article 
5 of the partnership agreement is cited to show that 
Terry's s~lary was an "expense item and not a dis-
tribution ()f profit to him.": (Respondents' brief, p. 37). 
Article 5 states that Terry's salary is to be de-
ducted before "any division of net profits is made." 
(Emphasis supplied.) If net profits as used in article 
5 are any different frotn gross profits as used in article 
4, it is reasonable that Terry's salary might be deducted 
in calculating the for1ner but not the latter. 
Respondents suggest that Finding No. 3 in effect 
14 
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means that Terry's salary is a "distribution of profit 
to him" Respondents' brief p. 37). Whatever respond-
... --:-~ 
ents meant by this, they surely did not mean to i1nply 
that Terry's salary is part of the 40% share 'vhich the 
court found him entitled to, because that would not 
be true. See Finding No. 4 (R. 69). 
CONCLUSION 
The relief sought by appellant on appeal should 
be granted and the relief sought by respondents on 
cross appeal should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
Robert W. Edwards 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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